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Abstract 
International Journal of the Economics of Business produced a special issue on 
'Symposium on the US brand name prescription drug antitrust legislation' in 1997. 
This case involved fascinating scientific and policy issues including price 
discrimination. Economic scholars contributed to the debate. This paper gives a 
management accountant's view on the competition policy issue. It clarifies the 
competition policy issue using diagnostic tools (an analytical construct and concepts 
of cost). These diagnostic tools have been able to give insights into the issue. 
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1.0 Introduction 
Competition in the supply of prescription drugs in the pharmaceuticals market has 
changed significantly, especially in the United States. The abolition of anti-
substitution laws by individual states that had prohibited pharmacists from 
dispensing generic drugs in place of branded innovator drugs has contributed to a 
dramatic rise in the sales of generic prescription drugs.1 In addition, changes in 
US federal law that speeded up the approval process for generic drugs, and health 
insurance companies contracting out the management of their prescription drug 
benefits to specialised pharmaceutical benefit management companies (PBMs), 
have also contributed to a dramatic rise in the sales of generic prescription drugs. 
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act 1984 (commonly 
known as the Hatch-Waxman Act) has also encouraged growth in the supply of 
generic drugs by lowering the costs of obtaining United States Food and Drug 
Administration approval, and thereby lowering entry barriers. It eliminated the 
duplicative testing requirement for a generic copy of a previously approved innovator 
drug, and helped increase the availability of generic drugs following patent 
expiration. However, the Act also protects the potential loss of an innovator drug 
by extending the patent. The patent has been recently extended up to twenty 
years from the date of the filing. 
A patent (in theory) confers perfect appropriability by granting legal monopoly for 
a discovery of a drug to a manufacturer for a limited period of time (Levin 1986). 
It is a very effective instrument for protecting the competitive advantage of new 
products and technologies in the industry. Drug manufacturers charge higher prices 
for innovator drugs as they try to recoup their sunk cost investments. In the case 
of drug companies, sunk costs consist of exogenous sunk cost, such as a plant of 
minimum efficient scale to produce drugs, and endogenous sunk cost including 
R&D and advertising, which are determined by business strategy rather than what 
is necessary to produce drugs. R&D, however, in this case could be considered 
as both an endogenous and an exogenous sunk cost, since a certain level of 
expenditure (the exogenous part) is such an essential aspect of operating in the 
drug industry. A manufacturer makes substantial investments in R&D, expecting 
financial returns from successful drugs high enough to warrant the effort and risk 
involved. If expected returns are too low, fewer projects will be pursued. If overall 
returns are more than required to justify the time, money and risk involved, then 
consumers are paying too much. Despite the protection conferred by a patent, the 
market power enjoyed by a manufacturer is only temporary. Aggressive entry by 
differentiated therapeutic substitutes competes away the advantages of the patent 
1
 An innovator drug is one that obtains approval from the US Food and Drug Administration after extensive testing, receives a 
patent on its chemical formulation or manufacturing process, and is initially sold under a brand name. A generic drug contains 
the same active ingredients as the corresponding branded innovator drug, and enters the market after the patent on the brand-
name drug has expired. 
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holder. The increase in the market share of generic drugs contributed to the decline 
in the financial returns on new drugs. 
The structure of this article is as follows. The first section discusses an analytical 
construct that is relevant to the analysis of the case. The analytical construct can 
help establish which facts are relevant and which concepts of cost will shed light 
on particular issues in the case. The analytical construct discussed is price 
discrimination. The second section reviews concepts of costs which are used with 
the analytical construct to clarify issues in the case. It then proceeds with a 
discussion on a profit-maximising discriminatory pricing model. The fourth section 
analyses price discrimination in the drug industry by examining the cost structure 
of the industry and the implication for R&D of price discrimination and pricing 
decisions. Finally, a conclusion closes this section. 
2.0 Price Discrimination 
Price discrimination exists when a commodity is sold at a different location at a 
price that does not reflect different transportation or selling costs to different 
purchasers. Stigler (1966, p. 209) defined price discrimination as: 
... the sale of two or more similar goods at prices that are in different 
ratios to marginal costs. 
There are, according to Pigou (1932), three forms of price discrimination. 
First, degree price discrimination involves a seller charging a different price for all 
different units of the commodity in such a way that the price charged is equal to 
the demand price for it, and it leaves no consumer surplus to the purchasers. 
Second-degree price discrimination exists when a seller is able to charge different 
prices that depend on the number of units of the commodity bought. Third-degree 
price discrimination occurs when a seller is able to segment his customers in such 
a way that each group of his customers pays a separate monopoly price. The third 
degree differs from the other two '... in that it may involve the refusal to satisfy, in 
one market, demands represented by demand prices in excess of some of those 
which, in another market, are satisfied' (Pigou 1932, p. 279). 
For the monopolist, price discrimination is to maximise profit (Robinson 1946; 
Schmalensee 1981; and Katz 1983). In addition to maximising profit, a certain 
form of price discrimination can foreclose competition and acts as a barrier to 
entry to potential entrants. Wilson (1993) argued that price discrimination can 
have adverse distributional effects and it can promote inefficient uses of monopoly 
power. In a situation where a monopolist serves two distinct markets in which one 
market is stronger than the other, and when discrimination is allowed, it is possible 
to sell the commodity at two prices. This is done by fixing a simple monopoly price 
at a level at which the buyers of the weaker market can afford to buy. If at a simple 
15 
NATIONAL ACCOUNTING RESEARCH JOURNAL 
monopoly price the elasticities of demand are different in the two markets, it will 
pay to raise the price and cut down output in the less elastic market, and to reduce 
the price and to increase output in the more elastic market. 
Price discrimination, on the other hand, can also have positive effects. Wilson 
considered efficient uses of non-linear pricing in the form of Ramsey pricing, 
particularly in cases in which the tariff offers the same terms to all consumers, 
product quality specifications are fixed and the firm is operating efficiently. Ramsey 
pricing is a pricing rule that deviates from marginal cost and its mark-ups are 
highest for those products that have the most inelastic demand. 
Price discrimination has been treated differently by the various antitrust agencies 
in the three jurisdictions. In the United States, the intentions of various Acts are to 
protect 'small' businesses by controlling big corporations, in the United Kingdom, 
price discrimination has been condemned as a discriminatory behaviour that 
undermines or destroys competitors and discount structures which are not cost 
related. In contrast, the European Union considers third-degree price discrimination 
as an abuse that imposes restraints on intra-Community trade. The pervasiveness 
of price discrimination means that it is likely to be a prominent feature in antitrust 
cases in these three jurisdictions. 
3.0 Concepts of Cost 
A good understanding of concepts of cost is particularly useful when there are 
multiple ways in which the concepts are used in managerial decision processes. 
Costs are used for a variety of purposes, and the same cost data that serve very 
well for one purpose cannot be expected to serve equally well for other purposes. 
In the context of this article, these cost concepts which are discussed below help 
to cast light on particular issues in competition policy. 
3.1 Variable Cost (VC) 
According to Clark (1923), variable cost means a number of 'accounting items' 
that vary in proportion to variations in business. In more general terms, it is a cost 
that varies with the level of output. The variation of cost is made with reference to 
the fluctuation of production in a short period of time. In the long run, all costs are 
variable. There are various terms for variable cost. Marshall (1916, p. 359) called 
it 'special, direct or prime cost'. His 'special cost' included the cost of raw material 
used, the wages of the part of labour spent which is paid by the hour or by piece, 
and the wear and tear of the plant used in producing the commodity. This special 
cost is the lowest price that an entrepreneur can accept in time of excess capacity 
or when trade is slack. Marshall stated that, in normal circumstances, prices must 
be above prime cost. 
16 
Competition Policy Issue In Drug Companies: A Management Accountant's View 
3.2 Fixed Cost 
Fixed cost is a cost that does not vary with the level of output. It is also known as 
fixed overhead. There are other terms for fixed cost. Clark (1923) used constant 
cost to describe fixed cost which means a number of accounting items that remain 
largely independent of business. Marshall (1916) called it supplementary cost which 
was taken to include standing charges for durable plant and the salaries of top 
management (his examples). Fixed cost in the short run is unchanged. In the long 
run, however, fixed cost is variable because all factors of production can be varied 
by management. For example, the size of a firm can be reduced or increased 
depending on the state of the economy and the performance of the firm. 
The decision to decrease or increase the size of the firm has an effect on those 
costs that in the short run are fixed. An example of fixed cost is investment in a 
plant which has a larger capacity than the existing one. 
3.3 Sunk Cost 
Baumol et al. (1982) defined sunk costs as costs that in some short or medium run 
cannot be eliminated, even by total cessation of production. As such, once they 
have been committed, they are no longer a portion of the opportunity cost of 
production. However, in the long run, all sunk costs are zero. 
Sunk cost may further be divided into two: exogenous sunk cost, and endogenous 
sunk cost. Within exogenous sunk costs, Sutton (1991) differentiated two cases. 
The first case is when firms incur sunk costs, associated with acquiring a single 
plant of minimum efficient scale, to produce a homogeneous product. The second 
case is when firms incur sunk costs associated with acquiring a single plant of 
minimum efficient scale, to produce a differentiated product. The irrecoverable 
fixed outlays incurred in acquiring a single plant of minimum efficient scale on 
entering an industry constitute a sunk cost which plays no role in day-to-day pricing 
policy; prices set depend on the set-up cost (the cost of acquiring the plant) only 
indirectly. 
In the first (homogeneous product) case, as the size of the market as measured 
by the population of consumers increases, the equilibrium number of firms entering 
the market increases. As a result, concentration generally declines. For any given 
level of concentration, any increase in the size of the market will tend to raise 
profits and encourage further entry. 
In the two-stage game, firms decide whether to enter at the first stage. Those 
firms that have entered set their prices at the second stage. These two-stage 
game procedures serve to make a distinction between long-run and short-run 
decisions, in which the former are decided at the first stage and are treated as 
fixed parameters in the second stage of the game. If a mistake involving entry to 
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the industry has been made, revenues generated in the second stage may not be 
sufficient to cover the set-up costs incurred. The entry decision of the firm will 
depend on two variables: the level of set-up cost at stage 1; and the expected 
price competition at stage 2. The decision to enter will depend on whether the last 
entrant has covered the sunk cost incurred on entry at stage 1. If there is greater 
intensity of price competition at the second stage, the post-entry profits will be 
lower and fewer firms will choose to enter the industry. 
In the second (differentiated product) case, firms offer products which are 
differentiated. Very few products are strictly homogeneous as transport costs are 
sufficient to introduce some degree of product differentiation among sellers situated 
in different locations. If transport costs are not important, small differences in the 
product can make a difference in the eyes of consumers. Even though the sunk 
costs incurred by all firms are equal and exogenously given, such differences may 
exist. When a number of distinct product varieties are produced, assuming that 
there are no economies or diseconomies of scope, separate set-up costs must be 
incurred to produce any one product. Therefore, firms will employ different strategies 
for different markets so that particular sunk costs can be recovered. 
One of the implications of Sutton's theory is that, in the short run, attempts will be 
made by a firm to achieve normal returns on existing capacity by means of price 
co-ordination policy. But this attempt will fail because rivals will undercut its prices. 
In order to recover sunk costs, firms may either merge or not renew their plants 
when they become obsolete. This will lead to a rise in market concentration as exit 
occurs. 
In the case of endogenous sunk costs, there are many components. Two examples 
of endogenous sunk costs are advertising and R&D expenditures. By incurring 
greater R&D expenditure or advertising expenditure at stage 1, a firm can enhance 
the demand for its product at stage 2. The increase in expenditure at stage 1 
leads to higher sunk costs being incurred at equilibrium. In addition, a firm has to 
spend money on advertising to induce consumers to buy its product. The larger 
the size of the market, the larger are the profits achievable at stage 2, and therefore 
the greater might be sunk costs at equilibrium. There are two empirical features of 
advertising (Sutton 1991). First, a threshold effect may exist; a firm has to spend a 
certain sum of money in order to have an impact. Second, the effectiveness of 
advertising is subject to diminishing returns. Advertising also creates brand loyalty. 
High endogenous sunk costs can contribute to barriers to entry into a particular 
market, particularly when new entrants have to sink liquid capital into frozen assets, 
whether tangible capital or intangible capital (Sutton 1991). The investments by 
new entrants may prove too risky as an incumbent, who have committed large 
amounts of funds to the business, may make retaliatory strategic responses to 
safeguard their investment. Certain investments by incumbent firms deter entry 
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and are profitable (though may suffer short-run losses) in the long run. Cave and 
Porter (1977) considered excess capacity, product differentiation, cost structure 
and vertical integration as barriers to entry. 
The above argument explains why economists attach so much importance to sunk 
costs as barriers to entry. Fixed but not sunk costs, on the other hand, do not raise 
entry barriers. Both incumbents and entrants alike are affected by FCs; 'they offer 
an advantage to the incumbent only to the extent that his output is greater, and 
this permits him to spread his costs more thinly than the entrant can' (Baumol et 
al. 1982, p. 289). 
3.4 Joint Cost 
Hawkins (1969, p. 44) defined joint cost (in discussing jointly produced crude oil 
and associated natural gas) as: 
... those costs incurred when the production of one product 
simultaneously and necessarily involves the production of one or more 
products. 
Kahn (1970) stated that the products are truly joint when they can only economically 
be produced in fixed proportions; they have no separate incremental cost function. 
Kahn returned to Pigou's (1913) example of the production of cotton fibre that 
would involve also the production of cotton seeds from which oil can be extracted. 
He maintained that there is no objective method for attributing '... causal 
responsibility for some part of the joint production costs to one of the products and 
the remainder to the other' (p. 79). 
Joint cost poses analytical problems; it makes, for example, product costing and 
pricing difficult. The difficulty in product costing was illustrated by Walters (1960) 
in cargo freight services. According to Walters, these costing difficulties can be 
established by analysing the accounts of a particular firm or examining technological 
relationships to find which items of expenses would be increased if the output of 
one commodity was increased. The degree of cost jointness '... varies from the 
case in which there are rigidly fixed proportions (which more or less corresponds 
to the trucking case) to that in which the proportions of the product are highly 
variable (as in oil refining)' (Walters 1960, p. 420). 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) illustrated the problem of joint cost in pricing joint 
products. According to Jensen and Meckling, any arbitrary allocation of joint cost 
without making any references to demand cannot be used in optimal pricing policy. 
This is because this arbitrary allocation lacks an economic explanation which 
reflects marginal revenues or marginal costs that are essential elements in any 
optimal pricing policy. 
19 
NATIONAL ACCOUNTING RESEARCH JOURNAL 
3.5 incremental Cost (iC) 
IC can be defined as the increase in cost as a result of producing a further output 
in addition to the existing output. Mathematically, the IC of product y2 is defined as 
c ( y v y2)" c ( v i ' °) where C(.) is the total cost function. The argument Is that the 
price of product 1 which exceeds its IC is not 'unfair' to the buyers of product 2 
since those buyers gain from the sale of product 1 at that price. Baumol (1986) 
considered that the consumers of product 1 are better off by the supply of that 
product. This is because consumers of the firm's other products must also gain as 
a group, and no consumers lose out in the process. 
The definition of which output is the first one for a firm that produces two outputs 
may be of crucial significance because the first output bears all the common costs. 
There is no limit to the number of outputs which have to be considered, and this 
raises the issue of ordering (Heald 1996). For example, Aumann-Shapley prices 
are based on marginal costs averaged along a linear path from zero to current 
production, and Shapley prices are based on ICs averaged over all possible 
orderings of outputs (Curien 1991, p. 82). 
4.0 Theoretical Issues 
Managed-care X, retailers 1, 2 and 3 and hospital Y are hypothetical channels of 
distribution for drugs produced by a manufacturer. Since there are many 
manufacturers producing drugs for a similar group of ailments, a manufacturer 
has incentives to give discounts to those entities that can increase its market 
share of a particular drug. Figure 1 shows the role of pharmaceutical benefit 
management companies in the discrimination of drug prices. PBM 1, as a 
middleman in a variety of transactions with health plans, retailers and drug 
manufacturers, inserts itself into the payment system. A patient becomes a PBM 
1 member by subscribing to a health plan in return for lower prescription drug 
prices. PBM 1 negotiates price discounts for its members in return for channelling 
them to retailer 1. PBM 1 also negotiates rebates from the drug manufacturer by 
steering its members toward a particular drug by using a formulary2. 
2A formulary is a '... comprehensive list of drugs designed to direct physicians to prescribe the most cost-effective 
medications. The list is organized by therapeutic class; the selection criteria for the drugs on the formulary are 
primarily patient care and secondarily cost' [Blissenbach (1993, p. 152) quoted by Elzinga and Mills (1997, p.298)]. 
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Figure 1 
The role of PBM 1 in exerting downward pressure on drug prices 
Patient 
Filled 
Prescription 
Premium Health 
Plan 
Copayment F e e 
Retailer 1 
Balance Due for 
Drugs Purchased 
by Members 
Share of 
Manufacturer 
Rebates 
P B M 1 
Negotiated Price 
Discount 
Placed on 
Formulary 
Negotiated 
Rebates 
Drug 
Manufacturer 
Source: Adapted from US Congressional Budget Office (1998). How Increased Competition from Generic Drugs Has 
Affected Prices and Returns in the Pharmaceutical Industry, The Congress of the United States, July 1998, p. 8. 
A drug manufacturer can increase its profits if it is able to segment 'customers into 
classes according to their demand elasticity' (Scherer 1997, p. 250). In the example 
above, the demand for a particular drug from managed-care X and hospital Y is 
elastic due to their ability to shift demand to cheaper drugs. On the other hand, the 
demand from retailers 1, 2 and 3 is inelastic. These retailers are unable to shift 
their demand to cheaper drugs because of the impracticality of getting consents 
from doctors who prescribe the drugs to their patients. By this segmentation, each 
group pays a separate monopoly price. Sales are made at higher prices to retailers 
1, 2 and 3 with inelastic demand (in price-insensitive customer market) and at 
lower prices to managed-care X and hospital Y with elastic demand (in a price-
sensitive customer market). 
Figure 2 shows the manufacturer's profit-maximising discriminatory price structure.3 
For each of the markets, the relevant marginal revenue curves (MR. and MRJ are 
determined, and they are summed horizontally to give a combined marginal revenue 
(MRc). The MRc is then equated with combined marginal costs (MCc) to determine 
the combined output; the combined output is at the intersection of MCC and MRc. 
The intersection point is then projected backward by a horizontal line, and is equated 
with each individual class's MR to give their respective outputs and prices. 
3The model is adapted from Scherer (1997). 
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In the case of a price-insensitive customer market, qs is the output produced at a 
higher price of ps per unit, and in a price-sensitive customer market, qw is produced 
at a lower price per unit (pw). 
Figure 2 
Price discrimination by the drug manufacturer 
Price-insensitive customers Price-sensitive customers 
Source: Adapted from Scherer, F M. (1997). How US Antitrust Can Go Astray: The Brand Name Prescription Drug 
Litigation, International Journal of the Economics of Business, 4 (3), p. 251. 
As the drug industry is characterised by high FCs and low VCs, the additional cost 
of producing an additional unit is small. However, the drug industry has to incur 
both R&D and marketing costs before the final products are manufactured. Greater 
expenditure in both exogenous and endogenous sunk costs may increase the 
demand for a firm's products through enhancement and development of products. 
These costs should be covered by the price of the final product in order to sustain 
incentives to develop innovative drugs (for a discussion on the cost structure of 
the drug industry see Schweitzer 1997). 
5.0 The Case 
The overall health-care system in the United States is exceedingly expensive. 
Rising medical care costs have encouraged more people to move into managed-
care plans as they generally charge lower prices than conventional insurance 
plans. Managed-care plans are able to charge lower prices by negotiating better 
rates from doctors, hospitals and other health-care providers, and by reducing the 
use of high-cost services. In contrast, retail pharmacies do not have the ability to 
negotiate with drug manufacturers in order to extract discounts. However, most of 
the savings appear to be from pharmacies in the form of lower prices paid to them 
rather than from the rebates offered by drug manufacturers (see US General 
Accounting Office 1997). 
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Health-care organisations seek to control and minimise costs without sacrificing 
quality by influencing the prescribing decisions of physicians. Health Maintenance 
Organisations (HMOs) and PBMs influence prescribing decisions in several ways. 
HMOs provide health care primarily through employed physicians, and therefore 
they have a direct influence on prescribing decisions. PBMs, on the other hand, 
have only an indirect influence on physicians as the patients are their members. 
Elzinga and Mills (1997, p. 289) remarked that 
The most effective forms of intervention by hospitals and managed care 
organizations influence prescriptions ex ante. These include (i) granting 
a manufacturer formulary access to consumers who are attached to 
managed care organizations or hospitals, and (ii) granting preferential 
(or even exclusive) status for a manufacturer's products with managed 
care organizations or hospitals. 
These organisations become powerful buyers which can influence the sales of 
drug manufacturers. They compile lists of suggested drugs (formularies) for their 
enrollees that encourage the use of generic drugs and cheaper brand-name ones. 
The use of formularies puts pressure on brand-name drug manufacturers to 
negotiate discounts as higher sales of generic drugs have led to lower average 
prices of prescriptions and a decline in the rate of return of brand-name drugs. 
Table 1 
Market share and average retail prescription price, by type of drug, 1994 
Innovator drugs 
Single source 
Multiple source4 
Generic drugs 
Market share 
% of retail 
pharmacy sales 
55.5 
27.2 
17.3 
% of prescriptions 
dispensed 
37.5 
26.5 
36.0 
Average retail 
prescription price ($) 
53.80 
37.40 
17.40 
Source: US Congressional Budget Office (1998). How Increased Competition from Generic Drugs 
Has Affected Prices and Returns in the Pharmaceutical Industry, The Congress of the United States, 
July 1998, p.15. 
Two tables compiled by the US Congressional Budget Office (1998) assist in 
understanding the structure of the US prescription pharmaceuticals market. 
An innovator drug can either be single-source or multiple-source. Table 1 relates 
only to retail pharmacy sales which constituted 49 per cent of the US market in 
1994. About 83 per cent of the total sales revenue was derived from innovator 
"If generic versions of an innovator drug were available in any dosage form, then all sales of all dosage forms of 
the innovator drug were classified as multiple source. Hence, an extended-release dosage form that had no 
generic versions was classified as a multiple-source drug if generic versions of the original formulation were 
available (US Congressional Budget Office 1998, p.15). 
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drugs, and single-source drugs were the major contributors. By definition, single-
source innovator drugs do not have generic rivals; their average retail price was 
the highest ($53.80) as manufacturers try to recoup their investments. The average 
retail price of innovator drugs with generic rivals ($37.40) was significantly lower 
than those without rivals, but higher than their generic rivals ($17.40). With the 
availability of generic drugs, PBMs, HMOs and other institutions preferred to use 
them as they tried to minimise their costs. As a result, generic drugs commanded 
a significant share of prescriptions dispensed at 36.0 per cent. Since innovator 
drugs formed a significant percentage of retail sales, competition among 
manufacturers on the basis of price has important implications for consumers (US 
Congressional Budget Office 1998). 
Table 2 
Average price differences to various purchasers in the pharmaceuticals market 
Type of purchaser (A) 
Retail pharmacies 
Hospitals 
Long term care facilities 
HMO 
Federal facilities 
Clinics 
Average invoice price paid for 100 
brand-name drugs (as a percentage of 
the average invoice price to pharmacies) 
1993 
% 
100 
91 
96 
80 
65 
95 
1994 
% 
100 
91 
95 
82 
58 
91 
Market share by (A) 
in 1994 (%) 
85.6 
4.2 
3.4 
2.7 
2.6 
1.6 
Source: US Congressional Budget Office (1998). How Increased Competition from Generic Drugs Has Affected 
Prices and Returns in the Pharmaceutical Industry, The Congress of the United States, July 1998, p. 25. 
Table 2 shows the price comparison based on the average invoices paid by various 
purchasers for 100 brand-name drugs that were sold largely through retail 
pharmacies. This table shows only the comparison of invoice prices, excluding 
rebates and other types of discounts that do not appear on an invoice.5 Rebates to 
PBMs are also excluded; these rebates are an important mechanism for lowering 
the average prices as manufacturers are paid for prescription drugs bought through 
retail pharmacies (US Congressional Budget Office 1998). Since invoice prices 
exclude rebates to PBMs, Table 2 may overstate the difference between the average 
prices that manufacturers earned from drugs distributed through retail pharmacies 
and the average prices they earned through other channels. Approximately 86 per 
cent of the revenues from those drug sales came from retail pharmacies. 
sMost discounts are negotiated 'in confidence' between drug manufacturers and purchasers and the information 
on these discounts does not become public (US Congressional Budget Office 1998). 
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The other 14 per cent came from other purchasers. In 1993 and 1994, federal 
facilities obtained the best average prices for 100 brand-name drugs (65 per cent 
and 58 per cent).6 HMOs, on the other hand, paid average prices of 80 per cent 
and 82 per cent in 1993 and 1994, respectively. Hospitals, long-term care facilities 
and clinics paid at least 9 per cent less, on average, than retail pharmacies for the 
same drugs. 
Figure 3 
Channels of distribution for prescription drugs 
Manufacturer 
Hospitals, HMOs, 
Long Term Care Facilities, 
Clinics 
Source: Adapted from US Congressional Budget Office (1998). How Increased Competition from Generic Drugs Has 
Affected Prices and Returns in the Pharmaceutical Industry, The Congress of the United States, July 1998, p. 14. 
Figure 3 portrays the transactions undertaken in this market. Most prescription 
drugs bought by various purchasers are from wholesalers. Some chain-store retail 
pharmacies, mail-order pharmacies, hospitals, HMOs, long-term care facilities and 
clinics also buy direct from manufacturers. In 1996, the majority share (75 per 
cent) of prescription drugs were distributed through pharmacies and other retail 
outlets (US Congressional Budget Office 1998). PBMs, HMOs and mail-order 
institutions found ways to reduce their mark-ups, and as a result, gained substantial 
sales volume (Scherer 1997). This has made them indispensable to drug 
manufacturers who seek to penetrate the market. Most HMOs have internal 
committees to list suitable drugs in a formulary for use in an illness. Listing in the 
formulary is critical to drug manufacturers' sales. Realising the importance of the 
formulary, HMOs began tough negotiations with manufacturers, eliciting discounts 
"The prices paid by federal agencies such as the Department of Veteran Affairs, the Indian Health Service and the 
Public Health Service as well as state pharmaceutical assistance programs are not affected by the best-price 
provision in the Medicaid rebate program which discourages discounting (US Congressional Budget Office 1998). 
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from weak manufacturers, and then using these discounts to negotiate further 
discounts from other manufacturers. 
PBMs use a similar strategy. When a physician regularly prescribes an expensive 
branded drug, a PBM representative will give a call advising the physician to use 
another equally effective and cheaper drug. If physicians refuse to accede, patients 
under their care will be assigned to other physicians. Drug manufacturers who 
refuse to give price reductions are dropped from the formulary. The threat of the 
loss of sales effectively enables PBMs to elicit rebates from manufacturers. 
Consumers who do not belong to any managed-care plans have to buy their 
prescription drugs from retail pharmacies, and therefore pay higher prices. Enrollees 
of managed-care plans pay much less than non-enrollees. 
Prescription drugs are different from other consumer products in two respects. 
First, consumers buy only drugs that are prescribed by physicians. Second, in the 
United States, third-party payers increasingly pay for prescription drugs. Physicians 
and patients, however, are only interested in the therapeutic effects of prescription 
drugs. In contrast, third-party payers are more concerned with minimising costs. 
They normally contain costs by 
(i) controlling the pharmacy benefits of a closed group of patients, and (ii) 
stimulating price competition and discounting among the pharmaceutical 
manufacturers (and among retail drug stores) for access to these patients 
(Elzinga and Mills 1997, p. 289). 
It was argued by drug manufacturers that revenues lost from discounts given were 
less than additional revenues gained from sales induced by price reductions 
(Weinstein and Culbertson 1997). Price discrimination increases drug 
manufacturers' profits. For their reported profitability, drug manufacturers have 
appeared numerous times near the top of published lists of, for example, Fortune 
magazine rankings (Scherer 1997). 
In the long run, it is difficult for a large number of retail pharmacies to sustain such 
a competitive disadvantage, especially with small profit margins. The price paid 
by retail pharmacies can be viewed as the price paid by consumers who do not 
belong to any managed benefit plans, and are therefore paying the most for brand-
name drugs. Between 1985 and 1997,14,341 independent pharmacies were forced 
out of business; by 1996, they were only able to account for 21 per cent of dollar 
prescription sales (Reekie 1997). 
6.0 Analysis of the Case 
In the pharmaceutical industry, a manufacturer has to make high fixed and 
exogenous sunk cost investments in a plant to produce the drugs. In addition, 
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a manufacturer has to make substantial endogenous sunk cost investments which 
has contributed to rising costs in the industry. The increase in this endogenous 
sunk cost expenditure by one drug manufacturer leads other manufacturers to 
follow and thus results in higher sunk costs incurred (in equilibrium). The increase 
in the level of endogenous sunk costs incurred by a drug manufacturer is '... in 
step with increases in the size of the market' (Sutton 1991, p. 12). This explains 
the strategy of leading research-based firms that contributed 12 per cent of their 
revenue on these endogenous sunk costs in 1991, up from 10 per cent in 1965 
and in 1992 the share rose to 16 per cent (the statistics were obtained from 
Schweitzer 1997). Only the computing, accounting machine and the office industry 
had a larger percentage of (endogenous) sunk cost investments than the drug 
industry (Schweitzer 1997). A drug manufacturing firm capitalises on successful 
new drugs by mass producing them. 
Danzon (1997) has produced an estimate of the cost structure of the drug industry. 
Table 3 shows all costs of the drug industry measured as discounted present 
value at the time of the launch. According to Danzon (1997), the discounted present 
value of the costs provides a more accurate measure of theimportance of R&D 
investments for the purpose of evaluating pricing adequacy. If these costs are not 
covered, drug manufacturers will lose the initiative to develop new drugs. 
Table 3 shows that R&D costs account for about 30 per cent of total cost and 
manufacturing for only 28 per cent. Danzon (1997, p. 305) remarked that 
The important characteristics of R&D for pricing purposes is that it is a 
global joint cost that is invariant regardless of the number of consumers 
or countries that use the drug. 
It is on this basis that R&D cannot be causally allocated to a particular patient 
group or country on a marginal cost approach (Danzon 1997). Other cost 
components are either joint cost across products within a country or across 
countries. Danzon remarked that drug development including clinical trials to prove 
safety and efficacy is conducted in many countries for regulatory submissions in 
those countries. The cost associated with drug development is thus increasingly a 
joint cost. For any compound, the primary production of the active ingredient is 
typically processed in one or two plants world-wide, and each primary production 
may produce several compounds. This implies that there is jointness in cost across 
products and countries. Costs that are ICs in a plant in one country are joint costs 
across products. Most of these joint costs are sunk by the time of product launch 
and price negotiation. By prohibiting competition from generic drugs, patent holders 
can recoup their investments in R&D by pricing above marginal cost. 
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Table 3 
The cost structure of the drug industry: discounted present value at launch 
(percentage of total cost after tax) 
Cost component 
Total R&D cost 
R&D 
Ongoing R&D cost 
Total manufacturing cost 
Manufacturing and distribution 
Capital expenditure (plant and equipment) 
Other 
Marketing costs 
General and administration costs 
Working capital 
Value of inventory 
Total 
Tax assumptions 
46% corporate tax 
31.1 
29.0 
2.1 
28.2 
25.3 
2.9 
23.4 
11.5 
3.3 
2.4 
100.0 
46% corporate tax, 
plus R&D and 
possessions tax 
credits 
29.7 
27.6 
2.1 
28.7 
25.8 
2.9 
23.9 
11.7 
3.4 
2.6 
100.0 
Note: Assumes 10 per cent cost of capital 
Source: Danzon, P. M. (1997). Price Discrimination for Pharmaceuticals: Welfare Effects in the US 
and the EU, International Journal of the Economics of Business, 4 (3), p. 305. 
In this industry, pricing decisions are important. Although pricing drugs at short-
run marginal cost is a first best option, '... the resulting deficits would require 
distortionary taxes in other markets to fund R&D' (Danzon 1997, p. 307). This is 
because short-run marginal cost accounts for only 30 per cent of total cost. 
If prices are uniform, there is a possibility that some products that can yield a 
positive net social benefit are not developed, and this is likely to reduce welfare 
(Danzon 1997). From an efficiency point of view, if a uniform price is charged to 
both groups, they are not charged according to their willingness to pay. Danzon 
(1997) suggested that Ramsey optimal pricing is used to set prices of drugs in the 
drug industry. 
7.0 Conclusion 
Price discrimination in the pharmaceutical industry is mainly due to the ability of 
the manufacturers to exploit the different elasticities of demand of various groups 
of consumers. This price discrimination eventually benefits and enhances the 
welfare of all consumers. Schererand Ross (1990, p. 500) concluded that: 
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Another pro-competitive effect is the tendency of unsystematic price 
discrimination to undermine oligopoly discipline ...to utilise capacity 
more fully, producers grant secret, discriminatory price concessions to 
a few aggressive buyers. Sooner or later the word leaks out, often 
through the effort of buyers to extract similar concessions from additional 
suppliers, and others match or undercut the cuts. As the price 
concessions spread, list prices become increasingly unreliable, and 
eventually they are reduced formally, benefiting all buyers and not just 
the favoured few. 
As the industry has large fixed, exogenous and endogenous sunk costs, 
the manufacturers have an incentive to price their products to sufficiently cover 
their total costs. By setting higher prices in an inelastic market and lower prices in 
an elastic market that cover at least their VC, they can quickly recover their 
investment and invest surpluses in developing new drugs. 
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